

**Top Secret**

NSA review completed



**Twelfth Report**

**COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF  
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS**

(This report covers the week from  
4 May through 10 May 1973)

*This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the  
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense*

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DIA Review  
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THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS\*

(This report covers the week from  
4 May through 10 May 1973)

The Key Points

- Two new infiltration groups of civilian and military specialists, totaling some 275 men, were detected starting south from North Vietnam during the week.
- Another NVA armor regiment has been identified in Quang Tri Province.
- Heavy North Vietnamese logistic activity continued all along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, in northern South Vietnam, and in the North Vietnamese Panhandle.
- Combat activity during the week remained at a low level in both South Vietnam and Laos.

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The Details

NOTE: This is the twelfth in a series of reports detailing recently received evidence of (a) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military materiel toward and into South Vietnam, and (b) Communist-instigated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements.

A. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese Personnel

1. A total of eighteen special-purpose infiltration groups--with an estimated strength of more than 550 men--were reported for the first time during the past week. Only two of the groups, with about 275 men, were observed departing North Vietnam. The other sixteen groups, which were observed in Laos and Cambodia, probably left North Vietnam about three to four weeks ago.

2. As a result of these detections, the number of North Vietnamese personnel who have started south since 27 January is now estimated to be about 16,000. Since the ceasefire, a total of more than 40,000 personnel have now infiltrated to the south, including some 25,000 who were in the pipeline as of 27 January. Because of the continuing detection of special-purpose groups, and the presence of stragglers from regular groups who are still in the pipeline, it is estimated that there are one to two thousand infiltrators currently in the system. (Annex II,  contains a more detailed discussion of the information on infiltration which was received during the past week.)

3. Another NVA armor regiment--the 201st--has been identified in South Vietnam's Quang Tri Province. Although we have been unable to determine when the regiment began arriving in Quang Tri Province from North Vietnam, elements of the regiment were first noted operating west of Quang Tri City on 20 April, and available evidence suggests that at least some elements probably arrived after 27 January, in violation of the ceasefire agreement. The location of the 201st Regiment in South Vietnam raises the current estimate of the number of tanks sent south by Hanoi since late October to some 600. This total is greater than the number estimated to have been committed to South Vietnam during the Communist's 1972 Offensive. Over 350 of these tanks entered South Vietnam after 27 January.


B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies Toward and Into South Vietnam and Laos

4. The pace of Communist logistical activity continued to be very high during the week. Trucks detected moving into Laos via Ban Karai Pass totaled 102 during the week, approximately the same level as detected a week earlier. (See Annex III, [redacted])

[redacted] Traffic remained very heavy on the major north/south routes through southern Laos, and a special effort is currently underway to move supplies from Laos apparently toward all of the major regions of South Vietnam. Large stockpiles of supplies--ordnance as well as food--continue to be observed in northern South Vietnam and southern Laos. Heavy vehicle traffic through southern North Vietnam toward Laos and South Vietnam also continues.

5. The following instances of Communist logistic activity were observed in South Vietnam during the period. (The map on the following page shows the roads and route numbers which appear below.)

- (a) NVA vehicle activity was observed on routes within South Vietnam during the reporting period as follows:



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- (1) [ ] 13 cargo vehicles were observed on Route 548 southwest of Hue in the A Shau Valley (4 northbound, and 9 parked).

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(2) [ ]

25X1

- 92 cargo vehicles were observed on Route 9 between Dong Ha and Khe Sanh (21 eastbound, 27 westbound, and 44 parked).

- 32 cargo vehicles were observed on Route 548 in the A Shau Valley (7 northbound, 16 southbound, and 9 parked).

- 24 cargo vehicles were observed on Route 616 southeast of Khe Sanh (3 southbound and 21 parked).

- 30 cargo vehicles were observed on Route 9222 southeast of Khe Sanh (13 northbound and 17 southbound).

(3) [ ]

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- 20 cargo trucks were observed on Route 608 northwest of Khe Sanh (3 northbound, 4 southbound, and 13 parked).

- 38 cargo trucks were observed on Route 9 between Dong Ha and Khe Sanh (7 eastbound, 13 westbound, and 18 parked).

(b) Other indications of logistical activity included:

- (1) Between 1 and 6 May, over 1,000 tons of cargo--half of it food--were detected moving from Laos into the A Shau Valley.

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6. During the reporting period the following indications of North Vietnamese logistic activity in southern Laos were noted. Historical precedent suggests that much of this activity probably involved supplies destined for South Vietnam.

- (a) On 5 May, 95 southbound vehicles and 76 northbound vehicles were active on Route 92.
- (b) On 7 May, at least 84 vehicles were active in the central Laos Panhandle.
- (c) During late April, over 3,000 tons of supplies were moving or in storage in the tri-border area. In early May, good evidence indicates that nearly 1,900 tons of supplies were moving in the same area.
- (d) During the period 2-8 May, 102 southbound vehicles were detected south of Ban Karai Pass; 111 southbound vehicles were detected there a week earlier.
- (e) During the same period 147 southbound trucks were detected on Route 1033, including 51 on 4 May.
- (f) The following vehicle activity was detected on Route 99 during the period:

(1) [ ] there were 52 cargo trucks observed on the route between Muong Nong and Route 96 (22 northbound, 21 southbound, and 9 parked).

(2) [ ] 26 cargo trucks were observed south of Muong Nong (2 northbound, 20 southbound, and 4 parked).



- (3) [ ] 209 cargo trucks were observed on Route 99 west and south of Muong Nong (206 southbound, 3 parked). 25X1
- (4) [ ] 145 cargo trucks were observed on Route 99 between Muong Nong and Route 96 (80 northbound, 44 southbound, and 21 parked). 25X1
- (5) [ ] 188 cargo trucks were observed on Route 99 between Muong Nong and Route 96 (106 southbound, 2 northbound, and 80 parked). 25X1
- (6) [ ] 228 cargo trucks were observed in the same area (22 northbound, 135 southbound, and 71 parked). 25X1
- (g) The following activity was detected on Route 9211 northeast of Ban Phone:
- (1) [ ] 39 cargo trucks were observed (29 southbound, 6 northbound, and 4 parked). 25X1
- (2) [ ] 30 trucks (6 northbound, 20 southbound, and 4 parked) were observed. 25X1
- (3) [ ] 58 cargo trucks (3 northbound, 24 southbound, and 31 parked) were observed. 25X1
- (4) [ ] 28 cargo trucks (5 northbound, and 23 southbound) were observed. 25X1
- (5) [ ] 122 cargo trucks (23 northbound, 90 southbound, and 9 parked) were observed. 25X1

(h) On roads leading toward South Vietnam the following vehicle traffic was observed:

(1) [ ] 50 cargo trucks (36 eastbound, 4 westbound, and 10 parked) on Route 9 east of Tchepone. 25X1

(2) [ ] 31 cargo trucks (8 eastbound, 14 westbound, and 9 parked) were observed on Route 165/966 east of Chavane. 25X1

7. There is additional evidence of the continuing movement within North Vietnam of military and other supplies probably destined for South Vietnam and southern Laos.

(a) On 30 April and 1 May, 78 vehicles crossed the Giang River in the southern North Vietnam Panhandle. On 9 May, 51 vehicles transited the area. On each date, half of those observed were southbound.

(b) On 2 May, over 35 tons of ordnance were received at a Giang River storage point.

C. Combat Activity Initiated by Communist Forces in South Vietnam Since the Ceasefire

8. In South Vietnam, the total number of Communist-initiated ceasefire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 28 January and for the last week (4-10 May) are shown below:

Military Region	Total Since Ceasefire Level of Action		Last Week (4-10 May) Level of Action	
	Major	Minor	Major	Minor
MR 1	883	2,929	26	79
MR 2	210	1,491	7	87
MR 3	328	2,015	17	84
MR 4	514	4,708	31	348
Totals	1,935	11,143	81 (94) <u>1</u> /	598 (581) <u>1</u> /

1/ Denotes totals of previous week.

9. Some of these violations may have been initiated by GVN forces rather than Communist forces, and it is impossible in all cases to determine the actual instigator. The table above and the chart on the following page, however, do show fairly accurately the trend in the amount of combat that has occurred in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular time and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese, even though the question of who started it may not always be treated in objective fashion. In some cases, the Joint Military Commission (GVN/PRG) also reports violations of the ceasefire.

D. Combat Activity Initiated by Communist Forces  
in Laos During the Week From 4 Through 10 May


10. The week passed with no reports of serious combat incidents in Laos. Minor clashes occurred, however, in the contested area southeast of Thakhek in central Laos. In northwestern Sayaboury Province, a government reaction force has succeeded in reoccupying two of three positions lost to a Communist attack on 20 April.




## CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF

(28 JANUARY 1973 TO THE PRESENT)


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
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## ANNEX II

Post-Ceasefire Infiltration of North Vietnamese  
Personnel to the South

1. Eighteen special-purpose infiltration groups--with an estimated aggregate strength of more than 550 personnel--were initially reported during the period. Two of these groups--both of which are destined for northern MR 1--appeared in COMINT originating from Binh Tram 18 in Vinh, North Vietnam. Almost all of the other groups that appeared in communications are destined the southern three quarters of South Vietnam. Based on current travel times, the sixteen groups noted in Laos and Cambodia probably departed North Vietnam in early or mid-April.

2. The following table lists those infiltration groups which were reported for the first time during the past week.

Infiltration Groups Initially Reported  
During the Past Week

<u>Group Designator</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Date of Detection</u>
A102	Unk	South Laos	6 May
A103	Unk	South Laos	6 May
A104	Unk	South Laos	6 May
A105	26	South Laos	6 May
A107	9	South Laos	6 May
A108	11	South Laos	6 May
A109	4	South Laos	6 May
A110	16	South Laos	6 May
A264	14	Cambodia	30 April
A283B	6	South Laos	7 May
A284	Unk	South Laos	1 May
A857	8	South Laos	7 May
QL457	116	North Vietnam	8 May
QL329	Unk	South Laos	6 May
QL338	Unk	South Laos	6 May
QL741	160	North Vietnam	5 May
Y298	9	South Laos	3 May
295	23	South Laos	6 May

ANNEX III

[redacted] vehicle activity at Ban  
Karai Pass now are considerably lower than they  
were several weeks ago. [redacted]

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[redacted]  
aerial photography continues to reflect heavy NVA  
vehicle activity on the main roads to the south of  
the pass areas.



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